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ABSTRACT
In 2010, the reverberations of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis had created a whole new
crisis in Europe. Five Eurozone countries, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus all had
requested financial aid packages, unable to repay their national debt. The crisis is ongoing in
Europe ever since, becoming the greatest challenge presented to the Eurozone since the monetary
union was formed. The intent of this thesis is to explore the effects of the Eurozone crisis on the
political systems of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. This thesis will study the effects
utilizing the most prominent perspectives in political economy: neoliberalism, neomercantilism,
and structuralism. This thesis also attempts to explain the recent rise in Euroscepticism in each
country, whilst seeking an explanation in the rise in three Eurosceptic parties: Alternative für
Deutschland from Germany, National Front from France, and the United Kingdom Independence
Party. Lastly, this thesis conducts a comparative analysis to find the common elements in each
case study, as well as the areas in which the studies diverge.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank each of my committee members, Dr. Sadri,
Dr. Mousseau, and Dr. Lyons for their commitment and support in helping me complete this
thesis.
A special thank you to my Thesis Chair, Dr. Sadri, for his dedication, enthusiasm, and invaluable
mentorship throughout this process.
I would also like to thank my family for their constant love and support.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
Context ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Purpose........................................................................................................................................ 1
Significance................................................................................................................................. 2
Hypothesis................................................................................................................................... 3
Literature Review........................................................................................................................ 5
Research Design........................................................................................................................ 10
Parties .................................................................................................................................... 10
Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 11
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 13
Chapter Two: Germany................................................................................................................. 16
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 16
Neoliberalism ............................................................................................................................ 18
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 19
Society................................................................................................................................... 21
Neomercantilism ....................................................................................................................... 22
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 24
Society................................................................................................................................... 25
Structuralism ............................................................................................................................. 27
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 28
Society................................................................................................................................... 29
iv

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 30
Chapter Three: France................................................................................................................... 35
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 35
Neoliberalism ............................................................................................................................ 37
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 38
Society................................................................................................................................... 40
Neomercantilism ...................................................................................................................... 41
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 42
Structuralism ............................................................................................................................. 45
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 46
Society................................................................................................................................... 48
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 49
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom ............................................................................................. 54
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 54
Neoliberalism ............................................................................................................................ 56
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 57
Society................................................................................................................................... 58
Neomercantilism ....................................................................................................................... 59
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 61
Society................................................................................................................................... 62
Structuralism ............................................................................................................................. 63
Leadership ............................................................................................................................. 64

v

Society................................................................................................................................... 66
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 67
Chapter Five: Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 72
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 72
Summary ................................................................................................................................... 72
Hypothesis Testing.................................................................................................................... 75
Comparison ............................................................................................................................... 77
Media .................................................................................................................................... 77
Role of Eurosceptics and Eurosceptic Parties ....................................................................... 77
Rise in Euroscepticism .......................................................................................................... 79
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 80
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 82

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Comparison of Perspectives ........................................................................................... 75

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AfD

Alternative für Deutschland (Germany)

CDU

Christian Democratic Union (Germany)

CSDP

Common Security and Defense Policy

ECB

European Central Bank

EEC

European Economic Community

EFTA

European Free Trade Area

EMU

Economic and Monetary Union

ESM

European Stability Mechanism

EU

European Union

FN

National Front (France)

IMF

International Monetary Fund

PS

Socialist Party (France)

SGP

Stability and Growth Pact

UMP

Union for Popular Movement (France)

SEA

Single European Act

UKIP

United Kingdom Independence Party

viii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

CONTEXT
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 establishing the European Economic
Community, Europe has been progressively integrating both politically and economically. In
2002, the Euro launched as the official currency of the European Union, becoming one of the
strongest, and most traded currencies in the global financial markets. In October of 2008, in
reaction to the defaulting of several major financial firms in the United States, several European
banks and financial institutions from Germany, France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and
Iceland all had to be bailed out with public funds. 1 By 2010, the global financial crisis reached a
new phase, with several weaker economies of the Eurozone reaching high levels of sovereign
debt; in April of 2010 Greece officially requested loans from both the European Union (EU) and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); by 2010, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus all had
requested financial aid packages from the EU. 2 The current financial crisis is the biggest
challenge presented to the euro since its introduction.

PURPOSE
The purpose of my thesis is to examine effects of the Eurozone crisis on the political
systems of Germany, France and the United Kingdom through the three main perspectives in
international political economy: neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and structuralism. I will be
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using each perspective to examine the effects on both leadership and society in all three case
studies. These perspectives were chosen based on their historical prominence in political
economy. Neoliberalism refers to the movement in the resurgence of classical economic
liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Neoliberal ideology promotes policies such as privatization,
deregulation, free trade, and fiscal austerity. 3 Neomercantilism stems from classical
mercantilism, the dominant economic philosophy from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries; this
economic philosophy emphasizes protectionist trade measures and maintaining a positive trade
balance, all to strengthen the state’s power. 4 Lastly, structuralism has its roots in Marxism, and
stresses the inherent contradictions and inequalities in the international system. 5 By analyzing
the political systems in the three case studies through all three major economic perspectives, this
paper attempts to gain a more in-depth, objective understanding of the crisis’ effects in all three
countries. This thesis also seeks to detect common elements between each case study to identify
the areas in which the three countries are interrelated, as well as to discover the extent to which
the case studies diverge.

SIGNIFICANCE
The importance of my topic is both theoretical and policy related. To date, the European
Union is the most successful economic and monetary union, as well as the most successful model
of international political and economic integration. The crisis has produced several unique
challenges in the EU, and most particularly for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. To
start, Europe has seen a major change between Franco-German bilateralism. Since the 1950s,
French and German cooperation has played a prominent role in agenda setting, coalition
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building, and facilitating European economic and political integration. 6 Recently, tensions have
risen between the two countries, due to differing approaches to solutions to the crisis. 7 The
United Kingdom, which has historically been Eurosceptic in both leadership and society, has
called for the EU to reevaluate its relationship with countries outside the Eurozone, with British
media encouraging leadership’s increasingly distance and independent relations from Europe. 8
Lastly, the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis has seen the rise in Eurosceptic parties in all three
countries. The prominence of Eurosceptic parties is expected in the United Kingdom, and to
varying degrees in France, but Germany has historically been largely pro-European, and the
upsurges of Euroscepticism is particularly of significance.
This thesis is also significant policy wise: Germany, France, and the United Kingdom
(despite remaining outside the Eurozone) are three of the most prominent members in the EU,
with each country wielding substantial amounts of influence in terms of policymaking in
Brussels. All three countries have the capabilities to greatly affect the future of the EU’s
economic and political integration in various ways. Notably, since the euro has also become one
of the most prominent currencies on the market, the policies promoted and enacted by these three
countries will also greatly affect international financial markets as a whole.

HYPOTHESIS
This thesis focuses on the current Eurozone crisis and its impact in Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom. The three economic perspectives, neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and
structuralism will serve as the independent variables, while leadership and society will serve as
the dependent variables. I hypothesize that neoliberals view the crisis as a booster for further
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economic and political integration, with leadership of all three countries increasing bilateral as
well as multilateral cooperation with each of their member states. Any resistance from society
will largely not affect leaderships’ European policies. Next, I predict neomercantilists view the
crisis, as stagnation for further integration, emphasizing discontent in society will ultimately
hinder cooperation amongst leadership in all three countries. Lastly, structuralism will largely
serve as the critical perspective. I expect structuralist will find that leadership in each country
will continue to only promote business and financial interests above those of their constituents.
Furthermore, I predict that neoliberals and structuralists will not find Eurosceptic parties to be
particularly significant in each country’s European policies, whereas neomercantilists will view
the opposite. I predict neoliberals view Eurosceptic parties as in the minority in each country,
and both leadership and society in each country will find furthering economic and political
integration more prevalent than Eurosceptic rhetoric. I expect structuralists to see Eurosceptic
parties as being ignored by the leadership, as each country will seek to promote only financial
institutions and business interests. Conversely, I predict neomercantilists to view Eurosceptic
parties to be significant, as they have the potential to threaten government stability and cohesion.
It is important to note that I do not expect any perspective to fully explain the effects of
the crisis in these countries. I hypothesize that each perspective will offer a unique insight into
situations of each case study. With each perspective, I will be able to come to a broader
understanding of how the crisis has impacted each country.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the signing of the ECSC Treaty in 1951 in Paris establishing the European Coal
and Steel Community, numerous scholars have written about economic and political integration
in Europe. This literature review is first divided into pre-crisis literature (starting from 1995
onward), general literature on the crisis, and country-specific literature, and then divided
chronologically within each section.
To start, “The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European
Integration” by Michael J. Baun published in 1995 provides excellent background information
on the debates and arguments between Germany, France, and (briefly discussed) the United
Kingdom. Baun argues that German reunification would come to dominate the European agenda,
and foresaw that integration in Europe would become “increasingly problematic and more highly
politicized” in the coming years. 9 Another useful source as an insight on the pre-crisis EU,
Christian Schweiger’s 2007 book, Britain, Germany and the Future of the European Union, in
which he provides historical background on both countries, then describes areas in which Britain
and Germany could cooperate. Schweiger argues that despite the famed Franco-German
bilateralism in the EU, Britain is a “prime choice” for Germany as a partner as the U.K., unlike
France, “has largely abandoned its post-war reservations” against the country. 10
Many authors have written works that encompass each case study within their text, or
simply discuss the effects of the Eurozone crisis across Europe. In 2011, Frank Bohn and Eelke
de Jong published “The 2010 euro crisis standoff between France and Germany: leadership
styles and political culture” and argued that the crisis exposes the inherent cultural differences in
leadership styles and attitude towards European integration. 11 Arturo Guillén’s “Europe: The
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Crisis Within a Crisis” published in 2012, argues that the Eurozone crisis is an extension of the
2007 Global Financial Crisis. Guillén reasons that a common fiscal policy is not enough to
address the consequences that the crisis has produced, but rather, the EU is in need of a
“rethinking of the entire project of integration.” 12 In the same year, Ulrike Guérot and Thomas
Klau’s “After Merkozy: How France and Germany Can Make Europe Work” describes what the
authors views as potential areas in which Germany chancellor Angela Merkel and then-newly
elected president François Hollande could work together to strength the EU as a whole,
particularly, in including smaller states in major negotiations and proposals. 13 Similarly,
Francesca Vassallo’s 2013 article “Sarkozy and Merkel: The Undeniable Relevance of the
Franco-German Bilateralism” details the cooperation efforts made by former French president,
Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel in the beginning stages of the crisis. Published in the same
year, “Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone
Crisis” by Joachim Schild also outlines the bilateral efforts made by Sarkozy and Merkel during
the initial years of the Eurozone Crisis. Schild notes that although Franco-German bilateralism
has been drastically different in recent years, leadership of both countries ultimately realizes the
strategic importance of their cooperation efforts. 14 Finally, Oliver Treib’s 2014 article “The voter
says no, but nobody listens; causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014
European elections” is an excellent source for categorizing Eurosceptic parties that have
appeared in local parliaments as well as the European Parliament in 2014. Treib views that the
2014 election reflects citizens across Europe’s concern about the implications EU membership
have on their countries’ domestic economies. 15
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The rest of this literature review will focus on country-specific articles, starting with
literature focusing on Germany, France, and then the United Kingdom.
In 2010, Simon Bulmer and William E. Patterson published “Germany and the European
Union: from ‘tamed power’ to normalized power?” which analyzes Germany’s legacy and
current leadership role in the EU. The authors argue that the country has moved from a ‘tamed
power’ that largely conceded its national interests to a ‘normalized power’ that uses its influence
to promote its national interests. 16 In his 2010-2011 article “A “United States of Europe” or Full
Exit From the Euro” Marshall Auerback discusses the significance of Eurosceptic parties rising
across Europe, and raises the question of a possible German exit from the euro. From the same
years, Sergio Cesaratto and Antonella Stirati’s article “Germany and the European Global
Crises” studies the economic imbalances across the Eurozone, as well an analysis of the German
reaction to the crisis in its first few years. This article is particularly useful for understanding
German economic policy since the country’s reunification in 1990. In 2011, Brigitte Young and
Willi Semmler’s raise the concerns of the repercussions of Geramny’s strong export economy on
the rest of the Eurozone in “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis: Is Germany to Blame?”
Ultimately, the authors argue that Germany wields tremendous influence in shaping the future of
the EU, contending that the country’s surge in Euroskepticism will either see a decline and
disillusionment with European ideals, or if German leadership can continue its trend for bilateral
and multilateral cooperation, the country can promote greater economic coordination and
political integration. 17 During the same year, Bill Lucarelli published “German neomercantilism
and the European sovereign debt crisis”. This article is particularly useful in its explanation for
what the author argues is Germany’s neomercantilist-based economy that with its emphasis on
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under consumption and high exports. 18 Joachim Schild’s 2013 article “Leadership in Hard
Times: Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis” finds that ultimately,
analyzes the state of the current Franco-German bilateral relationship and its significance in the
Eurozone crisis. Schild reasons that although during the initial years of the crisis the two
countries were able to push through strategic reforms, ultimately, the bilateral relationship has
failed to provide a “coherent and convincing governance framework for the future of the
Eurozone.” 19
Published in 2012, “The Relativity of Decline: a Reappraisal of French leadership and
influence in a time of global crisis” by Reuben Wong and Albrecht Sonntag analyzes modern
French leadership in both the EU and on the global stage. Wong and Sonntag argue that “France
has skillfully adapted to Germany’s growing power” and that French leaders will continue to
work with their German counterparts as a “motor of initiative.” 20 In the same year, Jean-Pierre
Darnis’ article “François Hollande’s Presidency: A New Era in French Foreign Policy?” raises
questions as to the future of France’s European policy upon Hollande’s victory in the 2012
presidential elections. Similarly, “The EU Discourse in the 2012 French Presidential Elections”
by Francesca Vassallo concludes that French leadership and society are “more distant from the
European idea” than ever before; however, the negative discourse circulating in the election
debates does not necessarily equate to anti-EU policies and agendas. 21 The 2013 article from
Sarah Waters entitled “The 2008 Economic Crisis and the French Narrative of National Decline:
Une causalité diabolique” studies the rise in Euroscepticism and nationalism in French. The
author contends the movement of national decline is not a new phenomenon spurred by the
economic crisis, but rather a movement that has its roots in the nineteenth century, which has a
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tendency to revive itself during times of economic hardships. 22 From 2014, Christakis
Georgiou’s article “’Whatever it takes’: The Eurozone Crisis as a Catalyst of European
Integration” explores France’s role throughout the European integration process, namely their
hostility towards economic and political unity, and argues that French leaders need to support “a
more centralized fiscal policy framework for the Eurozone.” 23
Oliver Daddow’s 2012 article, “The UK Media and ‘Europe’: from Permissive
Consensus to Destructive Dissent” explores the change in UK media’s support from European
institutions in recent decades. Daddow observes that negative coverage on the EU has forced
British politicians to become more anti-European to avoid backlash from the UK media. 24
Andrew Gamble’s “Better Off Out? Britain and Europe” briefly discusses the history of British
reluctance towards European integration, and then analyzes both arguments for the British
remaining in the EU or exiting the economic union. In his 2013 article, “David Cameron’s
European Policy,” Juha Jokela observes that David Cameron has been using Britain’s EU
membership in an attempt to shape Eurozone policies yet while constantly still trying to resist
motions that Cameron feels would infringe on British economic sovereignty. Jokela concludes
that it remains to be seen whether Cameron has enough political clout to instill the treaty reforms
he’s demanding, and warns that Cameron’s insistence on these reforms is likely to slow down
reforms needed resolve the crisis. 25 From the same year, “David Cameron’s Dangerous Game”
by Matthias Matthijs argues that Cameron is leading his country down a road of “isolation and
irrelevance,” citing there is a real danger of a British withdrawal from the EU due to hard-lined
Euroskeptic in Cameron’s Conservative Party as well as British voters that favor an exit of
membership. 26 From the same author in 2014, “Britain and Europe: The End of the Affair?”
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analyzes the history between Britain and Europe and how it has shaped their current relationship.
The author maintains that even if Britain exits the EU, Europe will still maintain a constant
presence in Britain in politics and daily life. 27 From the same year, “Farewell Britain? ‘Issue
Capture’ and the Politics of David Cameron’s 2013 EU Referendum Pledge” by Nathaniel
Copsey and Tim Haughton seeks to understand the political motivations behind Cameron’s
referendum guarantee. Copsey and Haughton argue the pledge was matter of ‘issue capture’ or a
“situation where a minority group takes near-total control of the terms of domestic political
debate, to the near-exclusion of other voices.” 28 Meaning, the rise in Eurosceptic politicians
(particularly the rise of the party UKIP) has forced Cameron to pursue hard-lined, isolating
European policies. 29 Lastly, Paula M. Baranowska’s 2014 article “The Coverage of the Eurozone
Economic Crisis in the British Press” studies the “inaccuracies in the coverage of the Eurozone
crisis” in the British media that has led to “a very unfavorable portrayal of the EU” in British
society. 30 Baranowska observes Euroscepticism in British media is largely used as a scapegoat
for politicians so they may avoid taking blame for major domestic (largely economic) issues. 31

RESEARCH DESIGN
Parties
My thesis will examine major Eurosceptic parties in each country. I will be
examining Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), France’s National Front (FN), and the
United Kingdom’s UK Independence Party (UKIP). These parties are categorized as
Eurosceptic, as in addition to their specific domestic policies, each party also holds anti-EU
sentiments. FN and UKIP are described as hard Eurosceptic parties, which either oppose the
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European integration project as a whole, or their countries’ membership in the organization. 32
While soft Eurosceptic parties, such as AfD, oppose only “specific policies or institutional
aspects of the EU.” 33 The distinction is important, as each party’s agendas have different
connotations and implications for each country. It is important to note that Eurosceptic parties
are oftentimes categorized as populist parties as well. Populist parties are usually defined as
parties seeking to represent the interests of the common public, emphasizing a clash between the
focuses of the general population and the elites. 34
Each party was chosen based upon their scholarly recognition as major Eurosceptic
forces in each country. FN has particular historical prominence in France (founded in 1972),
while UKIP and AfD are newer in comparison, having been founded in 1993 and 2013
respectively. Although the UK contains many parties that oppose British membership in the
European integration project, UKIP was founded with the primary goal of ending British
membership in the EU. 35 Additionally, since the outbreak of the crisis, both scholars and
journalists have recognized the rise in popularity of UKIP. Unlike France and the UK,
historically Eurosceptic/Populist parties have not garnered as much support in Germany (a
phenomenon expanded on later in this thesis). AfD was founded as a direct reaction to the crisis,
aiming to abolish the Eurozone and revert back to national currencies; they have been the most
successful German Eurosceptic party to date. 36 Thus, the party has become exceptionally
significant to scholars studying modern Germany.
Methodology
This thesis will utilize research from articles, books, and newspaper periodicals. For this
thesis, I sought to utilize the economic perspective as a theoretical framework for my research.
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Based upon the definitions provided in the Purpose section, I seek to understand how each
perspective interprets the gathered research, based upon my own understanding of each
perspective.
Newspaper periodicals will be collected from major newspapers in each country: Die Zeit
and Deutsche Welle from Germany, Le Monde Diplomatique and The Connextion from France,
and The Independent from the United Kingdom. Each of these papers was chosen on account of
journalistic esteem, Internet accessibility, and in certain cases, availability of English
translation. 1
My thesis will be comprised of five chapters: first, this introductory chapter, and next,
chapters two, three, and four will cover each of the three case studies (Germany, France, and the
United Kingdom). Each of the three case studies will be divided into five subsections: an
introduction, then analyses of the neoliberal, neomercantilist, and structuralist perspectives, and a
conclusion. Within each subsection of the casual variables, there will be subsections devoted to
brief introductions to each theoretical perspectives’ viewpoints on the case studies, then the
dependent variables: leadership and society.
The fifth chapter will be the conclusion chapter. The conclusion will contain an analysis
of the research presented in this paper. This chapter will summarize chapters two, three, and
four, along with analysis of the hypothesis and predictions mentioned above based on the

1

When choosing news sources, I was met by certain practical constraints. I attempted to gather
periodicals that were neutral in reporting, but still held journalistic credibility. I had a certain
amount of issues locating sources that were neutral, contained a substantial, freely accessible
archive, and, in the cases of German and French news sources, were readily available in English.
For this reason, I have chosen two news sources from both France and Germany as a means to
widen the pool of quality periodicals for my thesis.
12

research found throughout this thesis. Lastly, the concluding chapter will contain observations of
the common elements, as well as diverging areas found in each case study.

CONCLUSION
To conclude, my objective for this thesis is to examine the effects of the Eurozone crisis
on Germany, France, and the United Kingdom through the use of the three main perspectives in
political economy: neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and structuralism. I seek to gain a more indepth understanding of how the crisis impacts the political systems in each country, particularly,
its overall effects on both domestic and European policies in all three countries. I also seek to
examine the role of Eurosceptic parties in each case study and explain their implications, as
viewed through the three perspectives. With this paper, I attempt to fill the literature gap of
connecting both general research conducted on the EU along with country-specific research
conducted on the political systems of each case study to have a greater understanding of sociopolitical and economic effects of the Eurozone crisis.
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CHAPTER TWO: GERMANY

INTRODUCTION
As a founding member of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Germany
has played a central role in European institutions. Soon after World War II, Germany began a
historical bilateral relationship with France in order to initiate European integration. As Christian
Schweiger, addresses in his book Britain, Germany, and the Future of the European Union, the
Federal Republic of Germany (GDR or West Germany) utilized this bilateral relationship first as
a means to show to the world that the country was set on a new path towards reconciliation with
its former enemy as well as dedication towards the prevention of further conflict. 1 Secondly, he
argues the Bonn republic was able to exert a stronger influence over European affairs without
arising any suspicion from the United States and other European countries. 2 These advantages of
the Franco-German partnership became particularly relevant as Europe divided during the Cold
War. As the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union mounted, the international
system had become polarized between the East and West. Germany itself was split internally
along these polarized lines, with half of the country established as a democracy while the other
half operated under communist control. Most prevalently, as EEC member states grew weary
with US Cold War policies, Germany utilized its bilateral relationship with France to start the
Ostpolitik, a foreign policy focus towards Eastern Europe. Ostpolitik sought to normalize
relations between Western and Eastern Europe as a whole, but it primarily served as a means for
Germany to improve relations for Germans residing in both states within the Cold War context. 3
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The Franco-German engine served as a major catalyst for bringing closer economic and
political integration in Europe. Shortly after reunification of Germany, working alongside their
French counterparts, German leaders were able to rally support for both German reunification
and establishing the European Monetary Union (EMU) with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992. 4 For the most part, West Germany had garnered a reputation in European institutions
for its multilateral cooperation. However, since reunification, scholars have noted that the
country has become more assertive of its national interests, largely due to economic pressures
from an increased population and the political strains of diverging domestic views. 5 Currently,
Germany has come under increased scrutiny because of its leadership role in the European Union
(EU), and its policy proposals for the resolution of the Eurozone crisis. Many in both German
government and society believe that these crises are the result of the economic profligacy of
Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland, whose lack of fiscal discipline threatens the stability of the
Eurozone. 6 Furthermore, the financial crisis has also highlighted the disparities between
Germany’s economy and those from the rest of Europe. Since the outbreak of the crisis, it
became clear to many residing in the EU that Germany had become the biggest beneficiary of the
monetary union in Europe, and many scholars began arguing that the poorer periphery countries’
deficit was the direct result of the German economic surplus. 7
The Eurozone crisis has also produced another change in Germany: the rise of
Euroscepticism. This phenomenon is especially surprising, given Germany’s historically proEuropean attitude. Unlike in France and the UK, the legacy of the devastation caused by hypernationalism from the Nazi regime has suppressed the rise of nationalist and populist parties for
majority of Germany’s post-WWII years. 8 Although certain parties across the political spectrum
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have in one way or another voiced concerns over certain areas of integration, Alternative für
Deutschland or AfD has been the most vocal party to date. Economists and professors displeased
by the monetary union founded the party in 2013; its leaders seek to dissolve the Eurozone and
revert to national currencies. 9 AfD’s leaders have refuted its label as a populist party with a
nationalistic approach, but its conservatism on issues such as immigration have convinced
scholars and journalists alike otherwise. 10
This chapter seeks to focus on the observations noted in Germany’s political system since
the outbreak of the crisis. The first inquiry being has Germany become more assertive of its
national (namely economic) interests? Next, is the rise of AfD the result of the German public
becoming more Eurosceptic? And to what extent is AfD influencing Merkel’s European policy?

NEOLIBERALISM
Neoliberals emphasize Germany’s consistent commitment to strengthening and furthering
European integration. During the initial post-war years, West Germany moved away from its
Nazi past by suppressing any public display of national sentiments, with the Bonn government
supporting a foreign policy of strictly peaceful, multilateral negotiation and cooperation. 11
Neoliberals view that this strategy not only helped to strengthen Germany’s reputation as a
leader of Europe during the Cold War, but also launched Germany’s reputation as an enforcer of
peace between Eastern and Western Europe. Oftentimes, German politicians have opted to
continue European integration at the expense of ignoring both business and public interests. For
instance, during German reunification, the EC began debating the framework for the treaty to
create a potential single currency for Europe. During this time, both the Bundesbank and the
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Finance Ministry opposed the creation of a single currency, fearing the loss of economic
sovereignty. 12 Nevertheless, then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl strategically negotiated with both
French and EC leadership to ring in support of a reunified German state abroad, and support for
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) at home. 13
Post-reunification, Germany still played a vital role in EU politics. As Simon Bulmer and
William E. Paterson observe, through the Franco-German alliance, Germany has been a
prominent member in agenda setting and policy making, due to the largely “pro-European
consensus among the main political parties.” 14 This unusual support across the political spectrum
has allowed Germany to also become one of the key architects in framing European institutions.
Not only are the institutional structure and the regulatory policies of the European Central Bank
(ECB) modelled after the German Bundesbank, but also the ECB itself is located in Frankfurt. 15
Neoliberals view that Germany has not become more assertive of its national interests
from the Eurozone Crisis, but rather has continued its tradition of both multilateral cooperation
with its fellow member states as well as its influential bilateral partnership with France.
Furthermore, neoliberals view that the rise of AfD is a short-term reaction to the crisis and will
have no lasting or substantial effect on Germany’s European policy.
Leadership
When analyzing German leadership, neoliberals view that Chancellor Angela Merkel is
continuing the German legacy of strategic leadership in the EU, particularly with continuing its
historical bilateral relationship with France. Neoliberals acknowledge that the initial negotiations
during the beginning of the crisis came off to a rocky start. Chancellor Merkel and then-French
President Nicolas Sarkozy had differing opinions on how best to aid the inflicted countries.
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Sarkozy preferred to instill immediate bail out funds rather than following existing rules, while
Merkel staunchly advocated the strengthening of existing laws while simultaneously
consolidating fiscal spending cohesion across the Eurozone. 16 In the beginning of the crisis,
Chancellor Merkel hesitated to voice her plans to the German public due to an important election
in the region of North-Rhine Westphalia. 17 Many EU leaders and national leaders were
concerned with Merkel’s approach to the crisis, fearing that the Chancellor was leading Germany
into isolation in order best to promote its national interests. However, in May of 2010 Merkel
quelled these fears by famously saying, “If the euro fails…then Europe fails...” then proceeded to
call for a “more strongly [linked] economic and financial policy.” 18 In this speech, Merkel sent a
clear message to the EU and her fellow member states she was willing not only to cooperate but
also maintain her country’s historic role as a leader in the institution.
Ultimately, just as their predecessors had done before them, Merkel and Sarkozy were
able to reach compromises and lead the rest of the EU in building consensus around the
resolution efforts. First, considering the immediacy of Greece’s request for financial assistance,
Merkel was able to receive her preference and involve the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as
a way to ensure fiscal surveillance from both within and outside the EU. 19 The two leaders then
proceeded to both further integration and promote economic cohesion through several
institutional changes. German leadership throughout the crisis had been a staunch advocate of
strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as well as creating stronger rules for fiscal
coordination. 20 In the fall of 2010, with the help of France, Germany was able to successfully
reinforce the “preventative arm” of the SGP, which among other stricter guidelines established
enhanced monitoring over fiscal positions and government budgets; and created the European
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Stability Mechanism (ESM), a “permanent lending facility;” and lastly, established new
guidelines to further intensify fiscal coordination in the EU. 21
Overall, neoliberals view that Germany’s commitment to its bilateral relationship with
France in achieving greater political and economic integration is a testimony that the country is
not pursuing an isolationist policy.
Society
Neoliberals acknowledge that during the outbreak of the crisis, the German constituency
had begun to drift away from its traditional pro-European worldview.
From the beginning German citizens have voiced their concerns to bailouts for the indebted
countries. As Brigette Young and Willi Semmeler identify in their 2011 article, “The European
Soverign Debt Crisis: Is Germany to Blame,” the German public has supported its government’s
efforts in keeping a balanced fiscal budget over the past decade, taxpayers feel that instead of
reaping these benefits, they are being forced to bailout fiscally irresponsible countries. 22
Neoliberals recognize that from this discontent, AfD was able to emerge and attract a certain
amount of attention from German voters.
Despite these sentiments, neoliberals view that this dissatisfaction is inevitable in times
of economic duress, and are only a temporary phenomenon in German society. Moreover, AfD’s
anti-euro message has only resonated with a small minority in Germany. A 2013 poll found that
69% of Germans still wanted to keep the euro as their currency. 23 The poll also found that
support for the euro increased based on income, with only the lowest income households
supporting leaving the Eurozone. 24
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To neoliberals, the German people are satisfied with Merkel’s administration and her
conduct through the crisis. This was affirmed in the most recent 2013 election, when Merkel’s
party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had their best election in over a decade. As
Deutsche Welle reported on Merkel’s victory, “…Germans were unsettled by the crisis, the
Chancellor satisfied their demand for stability and orientation.” 25
Neoliberals view that Merkel’s high approval rating demonstrates the German public’s
solidarity with its government through the Eurozone crisis, discrediting any assertions that the
small fraction of Eurosceptics will gain any major traction.

NEOMERCANTILISM
Neomercantilists view Germany’s legacy in the EU much differently than neoliberals.
Neomercantilists emphasize Germany’s commitment to cooperation and integration in Europe as
a means for Germany to assert its national interests and regain power in Europe without raising
suspicions. This was particularly evident through its bilateral relationship with France. The goal
of the Franco-German partnership was to rebuild Germany’s international image and to
demonstrate to Europe (and the United States) that West Germany had destroyed all senses of
German hyper-nationalism from the Nazi regime that had destroyed its global reputation. 26
Neomercantilists view that this denial of national sentiments was merely “artificial,” and led to
“an exaggeration of European idealism” amongst the West German public and elite. 27
Furthermore, neomercantilists view that the Bonn Republic’s notoriety as the compromiser
during integration issues was also merely for the promotion of national interests. For example,
during the Maastricht negotiations, Germany took the middle ground between deepening
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political and economic cohesion in the EEC (French preference) and widening membership
(U.K. preference), but only because West Germany wanted to simultaneously expand
membership into East Germany for reunification, but as well as reap further benefits from closer
economic integration. 28
Scholars noted that post-reunified Germany was not as pro-European, due to the
fundamental differences in attitudes towards European institutions between East and West
Germans. 29 Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl had an increasingly difficult time rallying public
support for the Maastricht Treaty, with much of the German public resisting the idea of giving up
the deutschmark, feeling that Kohl “had sold the backbone of German economic growth”. 30 With
an increased population full of differing opinions, regional governments began to grow in
prominence when it came to European issues. In 1993, as established by Germany’s
Constitutional Court, the Federal government has the right to handover authority to supranational
entities on the basis that the Bundestag (the legislative body of Germany) and the Länder
(referring to the Bundesland, or the federal states of Germany) would also be consulted in any
negotiations or treaties. 31 This shared power in European policy has considerably decreased any
Chancellor’s hopes of signing onto any European agreement without considering public opinion.
Currently, as Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson have observed, Germany has
moved from a ‘tamed power,’ a state characterized by their constant multilateral institutionbuilding and agenda-setting, to a ‘normalized power,’ a state that is more and more increasingly
willing to assert its national interests and use its influence to “keep certain items off the
agenda.” 32
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Leadership
Neomercantilists argue that increased economic strains from reunification, coupled with a
larger populations’ diverging political views towards European institutions has had a significant
effect on German leadership’s European policy. 33 Likewise, neomercantilists argue that
Germany has always presented more conservative, protectionist economic policies. From the end
of WWII, the German government has exercised mercantilist-style economic policies, focusing
on wage moderation, under consumption, export surpluses and low imports. 34 Although
Germany had been cooperating within European institutions, the German government has always
been sure to keep a strong, competitive economy, giving the country an extreme advantage over
fellow member states. Consequently, neomercantilists assert that Chancellor Merkel is much like
her predecessors, and is dedicated to keeping the German economy stable throughout the crisis.
Therefore, it is natural the German government’s main priority is not to defend the interests of a
common European ideal, but rather to protect its national economic priorities.
This change in mentality came to light from the very beginning of the crisis. Whereas
French ministers seemed more sympathetic to the troubled countries, German Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble embodied the German indifference by “[urging] these states to become more
like Germany.” 35 Moreover, neomercantilists view that Merkel’s insistence on the involvement
of the IMF was a way to ensure that Germany would not be forced to bear the brunt of the
bailout plan, while simultaneously sending a clear message to other states in the Eurozone that
there would be consequences to pay for fiscal frivolity. 36 Despite EU leaders and member states
opposed Germany’s demands, Germany was still able to secure its national interests in the newly
created EU treaties. In example, although President Sarkozy was against a punishment clause in
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the European Stability Mechanism, Merkel still managed to push the policy through in the final
negotiations; she was also able to ensure that all countries requesting financial assistance would
undergo “tough fiscal discipline with limited emergency funding at high interest rates.” 37
Neomercantilists see Germany’s conduct in the Eurozone crisis is a clear indication that
the country is moving in a more assertive, independent direction. Neomercantilists view that
Germany’s upper hand in the negotiations efforts and the ability to override French suggestions
is due to the country’s economic might. As long as Germany remains the strongest economy in
the Eurozone, fellow member states must take Merkel’s lead.
Society
Neomercantilists disagree with neoliberals that the German public has historically
supported European integration. Neomercantilists note that the German public has often been
hesitant when relinquishing sovereignty (particularly economic sovereignty) to supranational
institutions. As stated above, German federal institutions do have considerable say in the
direction of European policy. Noted by Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, during the
conferences between German federal and regional governments regarding the proposed
Constitution of Europe, the Länd governments were notably vocal in demanding additional rights
for the Committee of Regions (the assembly for regional governments across Europe), increased
judicial and police cooperation throughout Europe, and greater endowment for qualified majority
voting (QMV) in the European Council. 38 Later when the Constitution failed and the Lisbon
Treaty of 2007 came to pass, most of the Länd government’s demands had been retained. 39 This
surprising observation is an indication of the influence German society holds in its country’s
European policy.
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Neomercantilists view that this trend is continuing during the Eurozone crisis. In 2009
when French President Sarkozy advocated for the creation of a supranational Eurozone authority
to preside over the ECB, Germans across the country protested, fearing the loss of independence
and sovereignty over its internal economic affairs. 40 Before Sarkozy’s theoretical institution even
became a reality, the German Constitutional Court “ruled any hypothetical European federal
economic governance as unconstitutional.” 41 Moreover, as the crisis began to intensify, the
German banking sector also played a significant role in influencing Merkel’s European
approach. In the debate regarding the issue of euro bonds, German banking officials called the
bonds “Giftpille” or poison pills. 42 The main concern of the officials was that the euro bonds
would not only increase German interest rates, but without a revision of the current treaties, it
would simply reward the indebted countries without any incentive to change their fiscal
policies. 43 This strong opposition towards euro bonds proved to be effective, with Merkel
successfully standing ground against Sarkozy, taking the issue entirely off the negotiating table.
In regards to the Eurosceptic party, AfD, neomercantilists agree with neoliberals that the
party will have no significant effect in shaping European policy. Due to the German societies’
successes in influencing not only its leadership’s European policies, but also EU policies as a
whole, the anti-euro message of AfD does not resonate with the German public. As long as the
Germany maintains the upper hand in resolution negotiations, the German public will refrain
from dissenting against the EU.
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STRUCTURALISM
Structuralists provide a more critical viewpoint to German leadership’s role in the
EU. Structuralists criticize Germany’s assertion that the Eurozone crisis was caused simply by
the profligate spending of the poorer countries. Indeed, structuralists view the crisis as more
complex, stemming from the fundamental flaws in the structure of the entire economic and
monetary union itself. As many scholars have noted, Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal have
all historically been a part of the European periphery, even before the implementation of the
euro. 44 Due to the nature of the Single Market, these countries were unable to implement
protective measures over their industries, and thus, were pushed further into the periphery,
incapable of competing with more economically competitive countries in the EU. 45
Furthermore, structuralists emphasize the hypocrisy in Germany’s approach to the crisis,
and the notable bias of EU officials. In 2003, soon after the euro was introduced into circulation,
Germany, France, as well as other states, were unable to meet the standards set by the Stability
and Growth Pact, and were to face punishment for noncompliance. 46 Instead, Germany and
France used their power in the EU to ignore the regulations to avoid penalty on their states, the
same influence they are now using to punish the indebted states for their similar lapses. 47 Even
more bothersome, statistics also specify that even Germany was unable to keep within the
Maastricht’s limits during the eruption of the crisis; though not as severe as the indebted
countries, Germany contained a fiscal debt of 83.2% of its GDP in the year 2010. 48
Structuralists agree with neomercantilists that Germany has historically used its economic
influence as a means to promote its national interests through European institutions, and that the
current Eurozone crisis is a continuation of this trend. Additionally, structuralists also agree with
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neoliberals and neomercantilists that AfD will not make a significant impact on Germany’s
European policies.
Leadership
Structuralists critically observe the vast influence Germany has in terms of agenda setting
and policy making within the EU, specifically these policies’ effects on the peripheral countries
As stated previously, Germany contains the largest economy in the Eurozone, and therefore
wields much greater influence on the final say in policy negotiations. In example, although
President Sarkozy was initially against Chancellor Merkel’s insistence on an automatic
punishment mechanism, this clause ultimately made its way into the newly revised SGP. Merkel
framed this clause as a necessity towards promoting economic cohesion, as these new guidelines
now calls for the EU to “put pressure on member states that are showing major macroeconomic
imbalances,” and allows procedures to initiate “sanctioning of non-compliant states.” 49 Policies
such as these prove to be paradoxical; they are aimed specifically at the troubled countries,
whose economies are pushed into the periphery from the inherent flaws of the union, and still
remain without substantial provisions to level the economic playing field across the Eurozone to
avoid imbalances in the first place.
Structuralists are also largely skeptical of Merkel’s commitment to keeping the Eurozone
intact. As Sergio Cesaratto and Antonella Stirati note in “Germany and the European Global
Crises,” the devaluation of the euro following the outbreak of the crisis led to a surge in German
exports to countries such as China. 50 Nevertheless, this export boom barely affected the
peripheral countries, and may have even hindered their chances to quicken the pace towards
recovery. 51 Moreover, structuralists recognize the close relationship between major financial
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institutions and industrial conglomerates. 52 This partnership “reinforce[s]…neomercantilist
logic” as German banks are more prone to invest in German corporations, which in turn pour
money back into German banks through their extremely profitable exports. 53
In the end, structuralists assert that officials both in German government as well as
financial and industrial institutions must realize that the German export surplus is a direct result
in the periphery’s deficit. 54 If Chancellor Merkel and her government do not begin to promote
fair distribution of national wealth across the Eurozone, all member states will ultimately suffer
in the long run.
Society
Structuralists notably disagree with the German public’s harsh perception of the indebted
countries. Structuralists view that the German citizens must focus more on their own
government’s conduct in the EU. Structuralists agree with the neoliberal observation that
oftentimes, German leadership will ignore public interest in favor of European integration.
Structuralists view that German leadership ultimately seeks to promote the interests of the
industrial and financial sectors. For instance, despite the general public’s hesitancy towards the
Maastricht Treaty, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl was able to push the major institutional
changes as outlined by the treaty by gaining the support of the industrial corporations. 55
Like neoliberals and neomercantilists, structuralists view that the rise in AfD will not
have any significant effects on Germany’s European policies. Despite the growing dissatisfaction
with the EU, structuralists realize that the country is still largely supportive of its government.
Therefore, AfD’s message only attracts a small, radical portion of the population. As stated
earlier, despite the party’s attempt to move away from its populist label, AfD seems to be
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attracting voters that are primarily fixated on a nationalistic message. In an article from Die Zeit,
author Nils Heisterhagen criticizes members and supporters for AfD for rousing nationalist
sentiments and promoting anti-Europeanism in Germany. 56 Moreover, conversely to neoliberals,
structuralists see the anti-euro party as catering to the wealthier German taxpayers, as the real
burden is not only being placed on the working class of Germany, but the working class of
Europe as a whole. 57 In an article from Deutsche Welle written by Ben Knight and Nicole
Goebel, the authors note that AfD’s leadership is primarily made up from academic elites, with
its support base “generally white, male, middle-class [and] aged” and highly educated with a
substantial majority of its initial membership holding doctorate degrees. 58 Structuralists conclude
that AfD’s support is highly unrepresentative of the German population as a whole.
An exit from the euro may seem appealing in some aspects to German society. Many
predict that if Germany did revert to its former national currency, Germany would likely flourish
due to Germany’s reputation for promoting healthy finances, but at the cost of its prominent
export base and the risk of increasing government deficits. 59 Structuralists argue that though antieuro parties may seem compelling, most Germans understand that the country would suffer
greatly outside the Eurozone.

CONCLUSION
The Eurozone financial crisis has produced two major effects on the political system of
Germany: the German leadership has taken a prominent role in conducting resolution
negotiations, while a considerable rise in Euroscepticism has been noted in the German
constituency.
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Neoliberals view the German reaction to the financial crisis as largely positive. Though
leadership was facing a certain degree of domestic discontent towards negotiations, Merkel was
able to use long-time bilateral cooperation with France to further Eurozone integration. First,
Merkel and Sarkozy pushed new agreements to increase fiscal coordination, and then worked to
strengthen branches of the ECB to create a stronger economic support system for the whole of
the Eurozone. Neoliberals’ view that AfD, will not have a significant effect on the German
government’s policy, as the German public is still highly supportive of its government.
Conversely, neomercantilists emphasize German leaderships’ prominent role in European
institutions as a means for the country to promote its national interests. Though Germany has
continued to work closely with France to resolve the issues of the crisis, neomercantilists notice a
change of conduct between the two countries. Germany has dominated the Franco-German
alliance in order to assure certain issues considering harmful to the German economy would
come off the negotiating table. Neomercantilists agree with neoliberals that AfD will be
ineffective in shaping the course of future European policies. Neomercantilists believe that the
German public trusts its government to support its national interests in the EU, and therefore find
no need to dissent.
Structuralists emphasize the hypocrisy displayed by Chancellor Merkel and her
government in her approach towards the indebted countries. Structuralists’ view that the German
government is using its influence in the EU to dismiss any suggestion that its own
neomercantilists policies may have played a significant role in causing the crisis, namely its
strong export base is directly correlated with the lower-economies’ deficit. Structuralists also
highlight the power of German financial institutions and corporations, and their role in shaping
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their leadership’s European approach. As for the rise in Euroscepticism, structuralists believe
that AfD is only appealing to a radical minority of the German public.
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CHAPTER THREE: FRANCE

INTRODUCTION
Together with Germany, France has a played a prominent role in European integration.
For France, its primary post-WWII foreign policy was to prevent the rise of a self-sufficient,
unified German state. The ECSC itself was able to come to fruition through the collaborative
efforts of Frenchman Jean Monnet (who later became the first president of the High Authority on
Coal and Steel) and French Foreign Minister Robert Shuman. 1 Monnet’s vision also began the
foundations for the Franco-German engine; the ECSC was a means to bind the two countries’
post-War recovery to one another to “render the two countries interdependent” and prevent any
further conflict. 2 The Franco-German bilateral relationship also served another purpose. Similar
to Germany, French leadership also found itself caught in an increasingly bipolar world as the
tensions between east and west mounted. As the German government sought to use European
institutions as a way to reestablish its reputation, French leaders supported European institutions
as a means to assert French leadership in Europe. 3 In this way, French leaders could establish
their country’s standing in the polarized Cold War atmosphere.
The Franco-German engine continued to facilitate integration, with French leaders having
the upper hand at the negotiating table. In 1985, another Frenchman, Jacques Delors, became
President of the European Commission (EC). Jacques Delors is now widely considered as one of
the most influential EC presidents. During his tenure, Delors strategically negotiated for the
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creation of a true single market in Europe with the passing of the Single European Act (SEA) in
1986. 4
Nevertheless, the French have had more of a complicated relationship with European
institutions than the Germans. Namely, French leaders have been able to be more assertive of
their national interests than their German counterparts. As mentioned previously, French leaders’
primary aim in integration was to use European institutions as a means to strength French image
in the international system. From the legacy staunch nationalism displayed during Charles de
Gualle’s reign as president to the more recent Non vote from the French public over the
European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the French have proved to be more skeptical of
European political and economic integration. 5 Moreover, many scholars have noted that FrancoGerman relations have loosened in recent years, largely to the imbalances between the French
and German economies. While Germany’s export-driven economy has become the strongest in
the Eurozone, France has begun to suffer from a shrinking industrial sector and stagnant growth. 6
This has produced a significant change in Franco-German bilateral relations from its original
Cold War context: with the rise of the German economy, the French have been relegated to
second-power status in European institutions.
Since the Eurozone crisis first erupted in 2010, France has seen two different leadership
styles: Nicolas Sarkozy from the center-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) from 20072012, then François Hollande from the Socialist Party (PS) elected in 2012. France has been no
exception to the rise in Euroscepticism across Europe. The National Front or Front nationale
(FN) currently headed by Marine Le Pen has been a populist force in France since the 1970s.
Regarding the EU, FN “systematically opposes the construction of the European Union” and
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historically has held nationalistic and xenophobic ideology. 7 FN’s sudden popularity has taken
both French and EU leadership by surprise. Generally, the party appealed to a narrow spectrum
of voters, namely young males ages 18-30; however by the 2012 elections, it seemed that FN
was attracting voters not only from the far-right, but those independents dissatisfied with the
main two political parties. 8 Following President Hollande’s historic low-approval rating in the
poles, in the May 2014 European parliamentary elections, the party won 25 seats, becoming the
largest French political party in the EP. 9 With the rise in popularity of FN comes the downfall in
approval ratings for President Hollande. As of May of 2014, Hollande had an approval rating of
just 18% amongst the French electorate. 10
This chapter seeks to explain the recent behavior of French leadership and society.
Arguably, FN has become comparatively more popular than Eurosceptic parties in Germany, and
even the United Kingdom. Therefore, the first inquiry for this chapter is to what extent has
Euroscepticism in France affected the recent volatility in French domestic politics? Next, how
has this Euroscepticism been affecting French leadership’s European policies?
NEOLIBERALISM
Neoliberals emphasize the prevalent role French leaders have played in shaping European
institutions. As mentioned previously, Frenchmen Robert Shuman and Jean Monnet began the
European integration process with the birth of the ECSC. During Jacques Delors Commission
Presidency, he not only made strides with economic integration, but brought the EEC closer
politically as well. He sought to make the European institutions more politically accountable and
democratic by increasing the powers of the European Parliament (EP) and cooperation between
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the EP and the Council of Ministers. 11 After the success of the SEA, Delors set in motion the
three-staged Delors Plan to start a monetary and currency union in Europe. 12
Referring to the previous chapter, neoliberals also highlight the importance of FrancoGerman bilateralism. Although French and German leaders were beginning their partnership at
the end of WWII and throughout the 1950s, it was in 1963 with the signing of the Élysée Treaty
that the relationship was truly solidified. Despite French President Charles de Gauelle’s
reputation as a staunch French nationalist, even he understood the importance of a bilateral
partnership with Germany as a means to maintain “peace on the European continent,” while
tying the two countries’ “national interests to European interests” to progress the EU’s
development as a whole. 13 This partnership was vital during the early years of the Cold War;
both French and German leaders feared becoming marginalized between the US and USSR. The
Élysée Treaty proved to be a step towards both safeguarding European interests during the Cold
War, as well as providing a platform for French leaders to lead Europe independent of the two
poles.
Neoliberals acknowledge the times when French leadership has been hesitant towards
European integration, but overall maintain that both former President Nicolas Sarkozy and
current President François Hollande understand the importance of continued cooperation during
the crisis rather than promotion of self-interests. Neoliberals also recognize the rise in discontent
in the French public regarding the EU, but view that this dissatisfaction will not have a great
effect on overall French European policy.
Leadership
Sarkozy. As stated in the previous chapter, neoliberals recognize the tensions surrounding
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the direction of resolution efforts between Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy. However,
neoliberals’ view that these tensions were ultimately positive, as both leaders brought strengths
to the negotiation table. Neoliberals commend former President Nicolas Sarkozy for his
commitment during his presidency to facilitating cooperation on EU policies and building
consensus amongst member states about EU resolutions. Even before the crisis began, Sarkozy
had been instrumental in encouraging cooperation amongst member states to tackle issues such
as climate change and immigration. 14
Referring to the previous chapter, Franco-German bilateralism was instrumental in the
initial years of the Eurozone crisis. Sarkozy’s main task during this time was primarily building
coalitions and striking compromises –not just with Chancellor Merkel, but also with member
states across the EU. Merkel’s comments regarding the indebted countries created enormous
controversy, creating two opposing economic ideological camps, with France and Germany at
the lead on each side. 15 Once the two leaders began to work more closely together to find a
common ground, no opposing coalition was created against them, making conditions more
favorable to both institutional and legislative reform. 16
Hollande. Throughout his campaign, François Hollande criticized Sarkozy for working
too closely with Merkel, citing the Franco-German relationship had become far too much in
favor of the latter. 17 Many leaders worried Hollande’s election would bring a halt to the
integration engine between his predecessor and Merkel. However, neoliberals observe that
Hollande understood the importance of the bilateral relationship. Neoliberals specifically point to
Hollande’s history as a supporter of the EU; Jacques Delors himself was Hollande’s mentor
during his early years in the Socialist Party. 18

39

From the beginning, Hollande has made clear to German leadership that his despite his
campaign rhetoric, he was dedicated towards continuing the strategic compromises with his
German counterpart. On the day of his inauguration in May of 2012, he flew to Berlin to see
Chancellor Merkel. 19 Furthermore, Hollande has emphasized the vital role of France’s leadership
position in the EU, calling it “a ‘linchpin,’ holding together the EU’s northern and southern parts,
building bridges between them.” 20
Society
Neoliberals acknowledge that the French public has seen a considerable rise in
Eurosceptic sentiments, but this disgruntlement with EU institutions will ultimately not shape
their leadership’s European policy. Furthermore, neoliberals view that foreign media and
scholars have over exaggerated Euroscepticism in France. As Reuben Wong and Albrecht
Sonntag note in their 2012 article, the French are often depicted as “a country in decline and
denial, out of touch with today’s globalized world,” when in actuality, the idea of national
decline is of little importance the public. 21
Neoliberals do not believe that Euroscepticism will have a significant hindrance in
French leadership and cooperation with the EU. Polls conducted on French opinion regarding the
EU have found that the French voters are overall satisfied with the positive outcomes of
European institutions, such as peace and stability across Europe, even when their opinions of
European monetary and financial institutions are low. 22 Moreover, scholars note that when
French leaders have a positive view of the EU and commit to strengthening institutions, the
French public corresponds with a more favorable view of the impact European institutions have
on the country. 23

40

Overall, neoliberals assert that just as French leadership recognizes the importance of
economic and political interdependence with Europe, French society too understands the
importance of cooperation with Europe, and feels the EU is still a vital stage for French voices
and interests to be heard globally. 24
NEOMERCANTILISM
Neomercantilists underscore the inherent historical and cultural differences between
French and German European political goals. The primary political goal of European integration
was to promote peace and stability throughout Europe, which according to French leaders during
the post-WWII years, was possible only by binding Germany through supranational
institutions. 25 In this arrangement, Germany could regain its reputation on the international stage,
and the French could have the upper hand in the creation and coordination of European
institutions. This political clout at the European level only lasted until the 1960s, when it became
clear Frenchmen at the European level differed greatly from the French politicians at the national
level. During Charles de Gualle’s time as president, French leadership’s primary goal in
European institutions was to ensure Germany would not resurface as a prevailing political power
in Europe, not to bring Europe closer together through supranational establishments. 26 This was
most clearly evident during the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-6, caused by de Gualle’s refusal to
allow the commission president to move the EEC towards a more supranational entity. 27
Neomercantilists maintain that anytime French leaders favored further integration, the primary
motive once again was to tame German leadership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
German reunification was the primary concern for states across Europe. Former President
Mitterrand initially was vehemently against reunification; his mind shifted towards support only
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on the realization to further fix the newly unified Germany in European institutions with the
Maastricht Treaty. 28
Furthermore, neomercantilists turn to the inherent cultural differences between French
and German economic schools of thought. Frank Bohn and Eelke de Jong, found that the French
attitudes towards the national economy aligned more closely to Southern European countries
(such as Spain and Italy), while the German economy combines Latin and Anglo-Saxon style
economies. 29 These differences in leadership styles illustrate the tensions in direction of
resolutions towards the crisis. As German economic power grows, the French citizens and elite
grow wearier of the diverging economic styles in the EU.
Neomercantilists argue that the Eurozone crisis has increased Euroscepticism amongst
French voters. Neomercantilists argue that crisis has become highly politicized in France, in turn,
causing political fragmentation amongst French elites. Moreover, neomercantilists assess the rise
in FN as French society’s dissatisfaction with their position in the EU.
Leadership
Sarkozy. Neomercantilists argue that President Sarkozy was too subservient to German
interests. During the beginning of his presidency, Sarkozy had taken a seeming nationalistic
approach in his European policy. Whereas neoliberals view Sarkozy’s commitment to
multilateral collaboration as a means of creating greater cohesion and cooperation amongst
member states, neomercantilists argue that Sarkozy was in fact attempting to invite other EU
members “to pull their weight” on EU issues. 30 During this time it seemed that Sarkozy was not
interested in establishing a substantial bilateral partnership with Chancellor Merkel, but rather
encouraging countries of similar economic attitudes (such as Spain and Italy) as a means to
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counter German influence. 31 For German officials at this time, the feeling was mutual. In an
interview, a German official admitted preference to a more elusive alliance with the Netherlands,
whom, as he felt, the Germans shared more similar ideals with. 32
Neomercantilists view the collaboration between Sarkozy and Merkel during the initial
years of the crisis as a result of the decline in French leadership in Europe. Although the French
economy is one of the largest in the EU and managed to avoid the Greek and Spanish levels of
severity of the crisis, the country still lags far behind Germany. The imbalances between the
French and German economies are most apparent in the industrial sectors, with businesses
unable to produce as competitively on a global scale compared to German enterprises. 33
Neomercantilists view that Sarkozy simply did not have the economic clout to defy Merkel’s
leadership. Neomercantilists also observed that Sarkozy’s economic beliefs did not align with
those traditional of France; Sarkozy’s party supported neoliberal economic policies such as
privatization, labor market reform, and the overall decline of government presence in the
economy. 34
During the 2012 presidential elections, the French public’s dissatisfaction with his
domestic and European policies became apparent. In an attempt to turn around his approval
ratings, Sarkozy’s rhetoric turned more Eurosceptic, advocating a new direction on certain
issues, such as reducing the French financial contribution to the EU. 35 In the end, French voters
proved to be unsatisfied with Sarkozy subjection to German demands. In particular, voters were
not impressed by his sudden contradictory EU polices, and his implementation of austerity
measures. 36
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Hollande. As mentioned previously, François Hollande was critical of Sarkozy’s conduct
throughout his 2012 campaign. Hollande’s national economic plans were entwined with his
policies at the EU level. Hollande ran on a platform which advocated the “reconsideration” of
EU austerity measures, and called for a “policy of growth” to be entwined in the SGP. 37 Despite
his rhetoric, as a mentee of Delors, Hollande had a more pro-European past. In 2005 he
supported the unpopular European Constitution, and numerous times throughout his political
career has promoted European political and economic integration. 38 Consequently, Hollande’s
EU position was largely to attract Eurosceptic voters, rather than based on actual belief.
Currently, Hollande is facing extremely low popularity rating amongst voters. In the
Senate elections of 2014, the polls were in favor of Sarkozy’s UMP with even more support for
FN; France’s right gained 187 seats in the Senate. 39 These elections were followed by Hollande’s
decision to form a new cabinet one-month earlier after “two senior ministers publicly condemned
[his] economic policies.” 40 Neomercantilists view that Hollande has fallen into the trap of his
predecessor and has failed in asserting French interests in the EU.
Society
Although the French public has shown signs of support for European institutions in the
past, neomercantilists argue that historically they have been more reluctant of European
integration than supportive. As Sarah Waters argued, French society has become disillusioned
with neoliberal economics, finding the ideology insufficiently protected the French economic
from the 2008 Global Economic crisis and the current Eurozone crisis. 41 Furthermore, the French
public has tended to negatively link European integration with globalization, immigration, even
Americanization, all of which in the past French citizens have voiced concerns over. 42
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Neomercantilists view these disillusionments with the EU as one of the main reasons FN
has risen to popularity. In the 2012 presidential elections FN attracted voters that favored
protectionist measures, were apprehensive of the single currency, and greater economic
sovereignty. 43 Since the election, these sentiments have risen considerably. In 2013, only 41% of
the population had favorable views of the EU, comparatively lower than the 43% standing in the
UK. 44 The political pendulum swinging to the Left in the 2012 elections and now back to the
right by the 2014 legislative elections illustrates society’s dissatisfaction with the main two
parties. Although FN and the rise in Euroscepticism does not seem to be heavily affecting
Hollande’s EU policy, it is causing considerable volatility in French domestic politics.
STRUCTURALISM
To a certain extent, structuralists do not view France as critically as they view Germany.
French leaders have often called for solidarity amongst member states, with the monetary union
to be more symmetric, with stronger countries offering help to weaker states. 45 Structuralists
agree with the neomercantilist observation that the French economy is more closely aligned with
those of the peripheral countries. France itself has also been experiencing trade deficits as
Germany continues to hold a surplus. 46
French leadership has also been a seemingly more munificent leader in European
institutions when concerning policy-making. Since the French economy does not have the
economic magnitude of that of the Germans, French leadership has often appeared less
intimidating and more palatable to smaller states. 47 Structuralists, like neomercantilists, note the
rise in tensions between the Franco-German collaboration, with the scales tipping more in favor
of Germany.
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Structuralists also recognize the French leadership often sought a more nationalistic,
often paradoxical approach regarding European institutions. In addition to containing German
power and wanting to assert French power on the international stage, Charles de Gualle’s
European policy was primarily to keep the EEC an intergovernmentalist organization with each
state containing a veto to keep the organization from becoming a supranational institution. 48
Ironically, de Gualle and many French leaders following after him also sought to make European
institutions a platform to project French power at the international level. 49 Similarly, the French
public has not always been sympathetic towards their fellow Europeans. Like their leaders,
structuralists view the French public as often very nationalistic, and at times of economic
hardship, obsessing over its perceived cultural decline. 50
Like neomercantilits, structuralists argue that Sarkozy was too subservient to German
interests, whereas Hollande did have the potential to become an effective counterweight to
German interests, but has been ineffective in doing so. Structuralists view the rise of FN
negatively, as the far-right, nationalistic viewpoints have contributed to hindering Hollande from
the ability to effectively lead in the EU.
Leadership
Sarkozy. Structuralists agree with the neomercantilist observation that Sarkozy was too
compliant regarding resolutions to the Eurozone crisis. Structuralists view this was in part due to
Sarkozy’s personal politics; UMP is a center-right party, no matter the disagreements between
leadership styles of Merkel and Sarkozy, fundamentally UMP’s capitalist ideology coincides
with those of Merkel’s CDU. 51
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Structuralists view that Sarkozy did have the opportunity to provide a more equal
leadership during the preliminary years of the crisis. Even though Germany is the largest
economy in the Eurozone and thus wields a certain amount of political influence, German
politicians are still hesitant to lead without their French counterpart without espousing fears
throughout the globe of another reincarnation of a hegemonic Germany. 52 Structuralists assert
that Sarkozy could have used this political clout to more effectively campaign for the interests of
the indebted states (such as the implementation of Eurobonds), and could have avoided the harsh
austerity implemented on his own economy. 53 Furthermore, Sarkozy appeared to have political
leverage in another arena: the French public. Sarkozy himself at the beginning of the crisis in
2010, that the bailout issue was not as hotly debated in France as it was in Germany. 54 Instead,
Sarkozy’s fundamental support for capitalism took hold, and he took a more subservient role in
negotiations, ultimately costing him reelection.
Hollande. Hollande did not share the same fondness of neoliberal economic policies as
his predecessor, and therefore had much greater potential to insight a change in the direction of
EU politics. Hollande proved to be the best of both worlds: although he campaigned against the
implementation of austerity measures and the domination of Germany in EU politics, Hollande’s
political past under Delors gave him a greater understanding of the EU framework. 55
Additionally, throughout the 2012 campaign, Hollande’s viewpoints on EU policies did seem to
garner support from other member states. Despite the fact that Europe is dominated by rightleaning parties, political elites in Spain, Italy, UK, and Poland all had expressed skepticism
towards austerity measures and the Franco-German dynamic established by Merkel and
Sarkozy. 56 Hollande also had potential political influence across the border in Germany. Upon
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Hollande’s election, his Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault established direct contact with the
German socialist party (SPD) “in order to put external and internal” pressure on Chancellor
Merkel. 57
Unfortunately, Hollande did not stray away from Sarkozy’s legacy as much as the French
public hoped. This was largely due to Hollande’s inability to live up to many of his campaign
promises. For instance, Hollande had promised to renegotiate the SGP to end austerity, however,
he found his German counterparts only willing to establish a small growth fund; he then
vehemently ignored criticism from across the political spectrum in France and advocated for the
fund’s passing. 58 As a result the French public has become dissatisfied with his leadership, and
as neomercantilists observe, caused the pendulum to swing back in favor of the right wing.
Society
Structuralists view the Euroscepticism in French society as being the biggest hindrance to
the country’s ability to being an effective counterweight to German interests. Structuralists are
empathetic of the French public’s frustration towards EU institutions. They agree with the
neomercantilist observation that French society has become disillusioned with the neoliberal
policies of the EU. In a survey conducted in 2013, 77% of the public viewed that the economic
system favored the wealthy, while 85% feel that inequality has grown substantially in recent
years. 59
However, structuralists view the recent Euroscepticism as correlated with the déclinisme
(declinism) movement, originating in the ninetieth century, which believes that France is
declining economically, politically, and culturally. 60 The rhetoric of the déclinisme movement
often takes on a very xenophobic tone often “shift[ing] blame for socioeconomic problems away
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from objective economic and political determinants towards the specific action of a culture
group” in attempts to rally support for nationalistic policies. 61 It is within this context that FN
has been able to advance in popularity amongst French voters.
FN’s popularity in France has contributed to the president’s inability to build solidarity in
the EU. FN’s leaders and supporters’ extremism coupled with those from the déclinisme
movement have placed political pressure on Hollande to shift more right leaning in his domestic
policies. Overall, FN and Euroscepticism in France have damaged Hollande’s ability to become
a proper political force at the EU level.

CONCLUSION
Neoliberals view French reaction to the financial crisis as largely positive. Both Nicolas
Sarkozy and François Hollande have understood the importance of continued Franco-German
collaboration. Neoliberals commend Sarkozy in particular for encouraging coalition building and
cooperation amongst EU member states, as well as working together with Merkel to further
integrate the EU economically and politically. Hollande has proven to continue his predecessor’s
European policy, closely working with the German chancellor as the crisis continues to unfold.
Neoliberals see the rise in FN and Eurosceptic sentiments across France as simply the result of
dissatisfaction with the French economy, and not having any significant effect on French
European policies. Furthermore, neoliberals do not believe Euroscepticism has caused any
significant fragmentation in French domestic politics.
Neomercantilists emphasize the growing economic disparities between the French and
German economies as creating a rift in Franco-German bilateralism. Neomercantilists view
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Sarkozy’s European policies as being too submissive to German national interests.
Neomercantilists view that Sarkozy was not a resistant to EU policies as his constituency. During
his campaign, his contradictory attempt to attract Eurosceptic voters cost him reelection.
Moreover, although Hollande had campaigned on a platform largely criticizing Sarkozy’s EU
policies, Hollande himself is far more pro-European than the French public. As a result, the
French public is extremely dissatisfied with his presidency. Neomercantilists see Eurosceptic
sentiments and FN as having a significant effect on French domestic politics, causing political
volatility, as French voters grow more disillusioned with the main political parties.
Lastly, structuralists agree with neomercantilist observation that both French presidents
have ultimately been too subservient to German interests. Structuralists’ underscore that both
Sarkozy and Hollande had the potential to create solidarity amongst the Southern European
states, as their economies more closely aligns with French’s. Both presidents have failed to make
the French position an effective counterweight to German domination in the EU. In regards to
French society, structuralists highlight the correlation in ideas of the déclinisme movement and
FN’s political objectives. Structuralists view that FN is distracting voters from the real issues of
the EU with nationalistic and xenophobic rhetoric. Furthermore, structuralists observe that this
Euroscepticism has resulted in political fragmentation in French domestic politics.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNITED KINGDOM

INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom (UK) differs from the two previous case studies, Germany and
France, in several ways. Most prominently, the UK is a member of the European Union but
remains outside of the Eurozone. Another being that the UK joined European institutions purely
for the economic benefits, not sharing Germany and France’s European idealism. At the end of
WWII, the United Kingdom emerged as a dominant power in the international system as an ally
victor. The UK was supportive of Post-WWII European cooperation from a distance, relying on
its relationship with the Commonwealth countries and the United States to keep itself from
becoming too dependent on Europe. 1
By the early 1960s, it was clear that the UK was declining as an economic and political
power. Once again, this was due to the polarization of the international system between the US
and the USSR. The US had taken the reigns as the newest Western hegemon, with the British
legacy from its colonization days waning to second power status. Their attempt at their own
European economic institution, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) had been unsuccessful,
and British government officials began to turn to the EEC for membership. 2 Since its accession
to the EEC in 1973, the UK has acted as a distant member, constantly fighting to opt out of any
laws or pacts that the British government feels may diminish their economic or political
sovereignty. The relationship between the UK and Europe has been more of “a marriage of
convenience,” with the UK satisfied only when it feels it is benefitting economically; however,
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since the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis, many in the UK feel that EU membership is no longer
in British interests. 3
Many scholars argue that the Eurozone crisis has exacerbated British reluctance to
European integration. With an increasingly Eurosceptic media fueling public cynicism towards
the EU, the British government, particularly Prime Minister David Cameron, has sought to
renegotiate the terms of British membership, even promising an In/Out referendum on EU
membership in 2017 if his party wins reelection in 2015. 4
Additionally, the UK has also seen a surge in popularity of the hard Eurosceptic party,
UKIP. As stated previously, the UKIP was founded in 1993, with its primary goal aiming to
remove the United Kingdom from EU membership. Like FN, UKIP has been noted to hold
nationalistic bordering on xenophobic messages, particularly its policies on immigration. 5
Despite its history of Eurosceptic sentiments, Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP have historically
never fared well in the polls, with major parties’ views on EU institutions having been more
attractive to the general public. 6 However, with the outbreak of the crisis, UKIPs popularity had
reached an all-time high, with more and more of the British public seemingly dissatisfied with
membership in the EU. On December 31st, 2013, the British newspaper The Independent
published an article entitled “The three main parties suffered in the polls this year. Only UKIP
truly did well,” in which the author calls the party’s record level of support “the most serious
independent fourth party incursion in British political history.” 7
This chapter explores and seeks to explain through each perspective these observations
that have been noted in British government and society since the outbreak of the crisis. The
primary inquiry being the causes for David Cameron’s self-inflicted isolation from the EU, and
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to what extent has his behavior been influenced by the rise of UKIP. Next, to what extent has the
British media played in fueling Euroscepticism in both British government and society?

NEOLIBERALISM
Neoliberals acknowledge that the UK has historically been a reluctant participant in the
European integration project. However, neoliberals also emphasize moments in British history
when both British government and society were supportive of membership. By the early 1960s it
had become clear to both British politicians and economists that the previous governments had
overestimated the UK’s ability to bounce back from the economic rut of the post-World War II
years. In both 1950 and 1960 the UK had amongst the lowest global GDP ratings, consistently
preforming far behind markets in Europe. 8 By this time, British politicians were humbled to idea
of EEC membership, now realizing that the economic community could potentially “provide
their country with a new base for future ambitions as an independent power.” 9
Later, in the 1980s, even hard-lined Conservative former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher understood the economic benefits of EEC membership. Although Thatcher spent the
early years of her premiership fighting to renegotiate the UK’s budgetary contribution, she
enthusiastically supported and signed the Single European Act of 1986, recognizing the
advantages of its “overall sound economic rationale.” 10 More recently, during Tony Blair’s time
as Prime Minister, Blair actively sought to keep Britain as involved in EU affairs as much as
possible. He even took the UK’s involvement beyond just the economic sectors, helping to
coordinate the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as well as becoming highly
involved throughout the Eastern enlargements during the 2000s. 11
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May neoliberals’ view that Britain’s current membership allows the country to the best of
both worlds: the UK is able to participate in the economic benefits that arise from membership
whilst opting out of the Eurozone. Neoliberals see Prime Minister Cameron becoming too
assertive of Britain’s national interests, mostly due to pressures from Eurosceptics within his
own party, as well as from the rise in UKIP. Neoliberals also acknowledge the influence of the
British media in shaping Eurosceptic opinions amongst the British public.
Leadership
As stated above, neoliberals view that Cameron’s current isolating European policies are
the result from pressure from the rise UKIP as well as from hard Eurosceptics within his own
party. Though Cameron has not been the strongest supporter of the EU throughout his political
career, neoliberals view that Cameron still understands the importance of British membership in
the EU. When Cameron became the Conservative Party leader in 2006, he famously urged his
party to “stop banging on about Europe,” knowing that his own party’s Eurosceptic rhetoric was
costing them reelection. 12 Furthermore, even after Cameron announced his 2017 In/Out
referendum promise, he still waivered in support for withdrawal of membership. Reported in The
Independent on January 24, 2013, Cameron “insisted ‘We should think very carefully before
giving that position up…We will have to ask ourselves is this…the very best future for our
country’.” 13
Cameron in some sense is simply continuing the British leadership legacy of European
policy, in that he is attempting to be involved with European affairs, while still retaining more
economic and political sovereignty than most member states. However, neoliberals find that this
may be an outdated strategy if the UK wants to continue to have a substantial impact in Europe.
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During the policy negotiations for the fiscal compact treaty, Cameron supported making the EU
a fiscal union, knowing that if the Eurozone were to disintegrate the ramifications would be
disastrous for the British economy. 14 However, when Cameron pushed that he also did not want
the fiscal union to be integrated within the EU as a whole, as a way to exclude non-Eurozone
members from having to implement any of its policies, it became clear to other EU member
states that Cameron wishes to “shape the rules of this inner union, but without joining it.” 15
Cameron’s desire is not only unrealistic, but is actually counterproductive, simply isolating the
UK from the negotiating table.
Neoliberals argue that if Cameron wishes to remain politically relevant in the EU, the UK
needs to start conceding much of its hard-lined, protectionist demands. As Matthew Matthijs
argues, if the UK wishes to wield significant power in the “EU’s institutional infrastructure” the
country will ultimately “have to join the euro itself.” 16 Otherwise the UK will continue its
dangerous path to political and economic isolation, and in turn will damage its role as an overall
global player.
Society
Neoliberals recognize that although the British public traditionally has not been
extremely pro-European, the majority of the British electorate “is not the radical euroscepticism
which seeks complete withdrawal”. 17 The increasingly eurosceptic British media has inflated the
numbers of British citizens that favor withdrawal. During the 1970s, when British citizens were
to vote on EEC membership, the electorate saw a wave of support for the “Yes” campaign from
the media, backed by pro-EEC politicians. 18 While the British media still remained critical of
European integration, the coverage was fairly even and unbiased. By the 1980s, during the
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budgetary renegotiations led by Thatcher, the British media suddenly turned sensational,
spouting fears over loss of national sovereignty and British identity. 19 Despite the embellishing
of British media the British public overall remains positive towards the EU. In a survey
conducted in 2012 by YouGov@Cambridge, the data concluded that a majority of the British
public favored Britain staying in the EU rather than leaving. 20
Furthermore, neoliberals argue that Cameron and Eurosceptic politicians are not taking
British business interests into consideration. In a report conducted for the Center of European
Reform, John Springfield and Simon Tilford analyzed the UK’s economic climate and prospects
and argued that the UK would actually greatly benefit from additional liberalization in the
service sector in Europe. 21 Many British executives are worried about the consequences of
Cameron’s referendum promise. In an interview with The Independent chief executive of the
WPP advertising group, Sir Martin Sorrell, expressed concerns that his clients “are worried about
the uncertainty and would suspend investment decisions or move elsewhere.” 22 Upon making his
referendum announcement, Prime Minister Cameron did not consider how investors and
businesses would respond to the economic ambiguity in the interim before the vote.

NEOMERCANTILISM
Neomercantilists emphasize the inherent cultural and historical differences between the
United Kingdom and Europe. They view that the growing tensions between the UK and Europe
from British isolation is a natural and expected distancing. As Christian Schweiger identifies in
his book, Britain, Germany, and the Future of the European Union, the Kingdom’s geographic
isolation from Europe coupled with its independent status as a historical world power has

59

produced fundamental distinctions between the British peoples’ perception of the European
integration project, and European citizens’ views. 23 Britain’s status as an island nation proved to
have many strategic advantages, as Britain was able to evade the constant destruction and
invasions that continental European countries were subject to throughout history; and
consequently, Britain’s political system evaded the continuous political instability that plagued
countries such as Germany and France. 24
These fundamental differences have been a foremost characteristic in British participation
in the European integration project. As stated previously, British politicians had no interest in
joining European institutions until the economic benefits of membership became too obvious to
ignore. After a rejection of their first membership application from French President Charles de
Gaulle, Britain was finally able to obtain membership a decade later in 1973. 25 It was only a year
later when the UK became the first country in the EEC to hold a referendum on membership,
only narrowly scoring an ‘In’ vote in 1975. 26 Since obtaining membership, UK Prime Ministers
and politicians have consistently asserted Britain’s national interests in the EU.
Even pro-EU Prime Minister Tony Blair exhibited moments of independence from Europe.
During the start of the Iraq war, Blair “prioriz[ed] Britain’s special relationship with the US”
rather than consult with the EU to debate the issue. 27
Neomercantilists believe that Cameron is simply continuing the legacy of British
reluctance of European integration. Additionally, neomercantilists view that UKIP, along with
Eurosceptics within his own party, have been pressuring Cameron to be more assertive of
Britain’s national interests.
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Leadership
Unlike neoliberals, neomercantilists highlight David Cameron’s personal reluctance
towards EU institutions and policies. Since the 1990s, the Conservative Party has been the most
Eurosceptic of the UK’s main political parties. 28 Since gaining leadership of the party in 2005,
Cameron has been no exception. Before gaining the premiership, in 2007 Cameron campaigned
against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, calling for a referendum to renegotiate the terms of
the agreement. 29 Furthermore, upon entering office, he passed a series of amendments, which
made any EU policy transferring power to Brussels to be subject to national referendum. 30
Despite this, Cameron’s Eurosceptic peers view him to be too moderate in his approach
to European policies. As Andrew Gamble identifies in his 2012 article “Better Off Out? Britain
and Europe,” the Eurozone Crisis has split the Conservative Party between harder Eurosceptics
that more closely identify with UKIP politicians that want the UK out of the EU completely, and
softer Eurosceptics that favor staying in the institution with a renegotiation of membership. 31 In
2011, when Cameron infamously used the first British veto on an EU treaty for not securing
economic safeguards for London in the European Fiscal Compact Treaty, right politicians were
notably divided. Some conservative politicians, such as Tory MP Bill Cash, praised Cameron for
setting the “path [to]…fundamental renegotiations,” while other Eurosceptics from both UKIP
and the Conservative Party criticized Cameron for not pushing hard enough. 32
As noted previously, British leadership’s support for European integration has appeared
only during times of economic or political duress. In other words, when it was in British interests
to be pro-European. As Cameron commented in a speech in 2011, “…We will remain in the
European Union as long as it is in our interests to do so”. 33 With Germany and France pushing
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both EU and Eurozone member states to become more closely integrated economically and
politically than ever, UK leadership feels the looming threat of loss of national sovereignty.
Neomercantilists believe that Cameron will continue on his path of distancing the UK from the
EU as pressure from UKIP and within the Conservative Party builds.
Society
Neomercantilists assert that overall, British opposition to EU membership outweighs
support. Once again, neomercantilists stress underlying historical and cultural differences
between Britons and Europeans. Just as their leadership as possessed a legacy of reluctance
towards Europe, so has the British people. Whereas centuries of warfare has shaped citizens in
Europe to view European integration “as an integral part of national identity,” British citizens
“tend to see Europe as a threat” to British national identity. 34 Neomercantilists view that the
Eurozone Crisis has made the British electorate more Eurosceptic. Despite all the criticism
Cameron received from fellow UK politicians as well as from peers in Europe when he vetoed
the European Fiscal Compact Treaty, Cameron’s public approval spiked, with media outlets
praising him for keeping the ‘bulldog spirit’. 35 Euroscepticism amongst the British public can
also be noted in the rise of UKIP. In 2013, the party steadily advanced in the polls amongst
conservatives at the expense of the Conservative Party; later in 2014 European Parliamentary
elections; UKIP came on top beating out both the Conservative and Labour Party. 36
Neomercantilists acknowledge the role that British media has played in fueling
Euroscepticism since the eruption of the Eurozone Crisis. Yet, note that historically the British
media has been critical of British participation in European integration. As Christian Schweiger
noted in his 2007 book, even during the cooperative years during Tony Blair’s administration,
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Euroscepticism in the British media still posed a great challenge in gaining public support on
involvement in the EU. 37
Neomercantilists disagree with the neoliberal assumption that the UK will need to further
integrate with Europe in order to survive economically. Economists have argued that the UK
economy is ultimately still globally oriented, particularly with its close ties to the United
States. 38 Furthermore, the EU is hindered the UK from effectively growing its business and
financial sectors across the globe, and an exit would free the UK from the EU’s ‘burdensome’
regulations. 39

STRUCTURALISM
Structuralists argue that the UK’s membership in European institutions has historically
stood for promotion of national economic interests. Politicians in the UK never shared the
cooperative idealism of their European counterparts. Britain’s primary motivation for
encouraging Germany and France to cooperate through economic institutions was to ensure that
no future European conflicts could impose additional damage onto the UK’s territory and
economy. 40 Furthermore, many of the same incentives of the UK to stay out of European
integration directly after WWII exist today: Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth
countries and its relationship with the United States. 41 Structuralists view that the UK only
started to take the EEC seriously once it realized it had reached ‘imperial overstretch’ in its
former colonies and “second-power status” on the global front during the Cold War. 42
Structuralists emphasize the UK’s paradoxical nature as a member state. These
paradoxical policies are usually the result of anti-European minority dominating party politics.
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Contradictory European strategies were particularly apparent during the Thatcher administration.
During this time, the Labour Party (now known for its pro-European stance during the Blair
administration) was staunchly the most anti-European party, strangely enough; agreeing with
their (Conservative) Prime Minister on her hard-lined, nationalistic rhetoric, while those in her
own party disagreed with her negotiation tactics. 43 These Eurosceptic Labour politicians believed
that the EEC was too economically liberal, while pro-European Conservative politicians saw the
EEC as a means to tame socialist policies at home. 44
Structuralists believe that Cameron is falling under the same trap that the Labour Party
did during the 1980s. Just as Labour had, Cameron is allowing a Eurosceptic minority on the
right to influence his European policies. Moreover, structuralists also view that Cameron is using
the Eurozone crisis has a scapegoat for economic problems at home. Regarding media influence,
structuralists also view that the British media has directly resulted in the rise of UKIP, from
sensationalizing EU politics and issues in the press.
Leadership
Like neoliberals, structuralists argue that Cameron is caving in to the demands of the
Eurosceptic politicians from UKIP and from those in his own party. As Matthias Matthijs notes
in his 2013 article, “David Cameron’s Dangerous Game,” Cameron is continuing the tradition of
two of his Conservative processors, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, by letting his party
splinter itself apart over the subject of European integration. 45 However, similar to
neomercantilists, structuralists also recognize Cameron’s personal reluctance to European
institutions. 46 Nevertheless, unlike neoliberals and neomercantilists, structuralists contend that
Cameron secretly welcomes the pressure from Eurosceptic politicians. Similar to other

64

governments across the West after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, and as a member state in
the EU during the Eurozone Crisis, the UK has implemented harsh austerity policies insisting
they will increase economic growth. 47 Cameron, as well as other on the UK right, are using EU
membership as an excuse for the implementation of these austerity measures as a scapegoat for
Britain’s lackluster economic performance in recent years. 48
Structuralists view that Cameron’s European policies since the outbreak of the Eurozone
Crisis have become increasingly contradictory, though not unlike UK politicians before him.
Despite Churchill’s infamous speech encouraging a formation of a “United States of Europe”,
UK leaders historically have been incredibly reluctant of political integration efforts, often
promoting enlarging the EU in efforts to hinder deepening of political and economic
integration. 49 Yet, Cameron and his minister support closer integration for Eurozone countries,
knowing that fragmentation would have devastating consequences on the British economy. 50
Structuralists agree with the neoliberal observation that the British wish to wield power in
shaping EU policies without having to actually follow them. As Nathaniel Copsey and Time
Haughton have noted in their 2014 article, “Farewell Britannia?,” Cameron and other
Conservatives advocating for a renegotiation of membership fail to realize that Cameron must
convince all 27 member states to approve of their demands at any cost, under the impression that
each state fear more of losing the UK as a member than the stresses it will cost them in the
renegotiation package. 51 Structuralists view that this sense of arrogance will worsen the UK’s
chances for securing their requests at the negotiation table.

65

Society
Like neoliberals, structuralists also note the importance of the media and UKIP in fueling
anti-EU sentiments in the British public. Structuralists disagree with the neomercantilists that the
British media has always been critical of the EU. During the first In/Out referendum held in
1975, much of the British press backed the ‘Yes’ campaign, leading to the success of the proEEC campaigners. 52 The major difference between the former pro-European press and the
current Eurosceptic media are the backers. During the 1975 referendum, the ‘Yes’ campaign was
better funded than the oppositional campaign, with politicians and civil servants targeting
influential sectors of the media to rally public support. 53 As stated previously, many British
politicians now use Europe as an excuse for the UK’s recession, to turn the blame from being put
upon them.
A detail that neomercantilists and neoliberals often ignore; structuralists note the how
oftentimes the language used in the British media when covering EU affairs has taken a
nationalistic and xenophobic tone. In a study conducted in her 2014 article, Paula Baranowska
observes that when covering European affairs since the Eurozone Crisis, British media has taken
an ‘Us versus Them’ approach. Many journalists make such claims on a number of issues that
the Crisis is a European problem that not only has massive repercussions for the UK, but global
implications due to the institutions’ inefficiencies. 54 Similarly, this sensationalization by the
media has directly resulted in the rise of UKIP in popularity. As an anti-EU party, UKIP
embodies this attitude of xenophobia. When confronted by a Conservative minister about his
racist remarks, Nigel Farage (UKIP’s leadership) dismissed his comments saying that the British
people “are genuinely concerned about opening up the door to Bulgaria and Romania’ following
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with that he believed that Romanians in the country were already causing a ‘crime wave in
London.” 55
This sensationalization by the media has continued to espouse irrational fears about the
EU in the public, and distracting them from important domestic issues. A 2012 poll surveying
the British public discovering that “only six percent of respondents” view “Europe as the most
salient issue facing the country,” while the rest of the electorate prioritized the economy and
unemployment. 56 Studies as these reveal that most of the country is not as Eurosceptic as media
and politicians choose to believe.

CONCLUSION
To conclude, the UK is different from this thesis’ two previous case studies for several
reasons. Primarily, the UK, while being a EU member, remains outside of the Eurozone.
Historically, the UK has always been described as an ‘awkward partner,’ very reluctant to cede
any control to the EU’s supranational entities. Lastly, since the outbreak of the Crisis, the British
media has turned increasingly Eurosceptic, resulting in the rise of UKIP and seemingly anti-EU
sentiments amongst the British public.
Neoliberals choose to emphasize instances in British history where both the politicians
and public have supported membership in European institutions; even instances where UK
leaders have helped to further integrate European institutions. Neoliberals view that Cameron’s
current European policies are the result of pressure from Eurosceptics within his party and from
those in UKIP. At the same time, neoliberals view that Cameron is continuing a British
leadership legacy of wanting to be the forerunner in shaping EU policies without having to adopt
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them. Neoliberal view that ultimately if the UK wants to continue to remain relevant not just in
Europe but on the global front as a whole, they must not only cooperate with the Eurozone, but
join the single currency itself.
Conversely, neomercantilists view that the increased distance between the UK and
Europe was inevitable. Neomercantilists emphasize British reluctance towards European
integration, feeling that Cameron’s actions are no different than any other UK prime minister.
Neomercantilists do believe that the rise of UKIP has put pressure onto Cameron to be more
aggressive in compromises with Brussels; however, Cameron himself has historically not been
the biggest support of EU policies. Cameron’s promises for renegotiation of membership as well
as an in/out referendum in 2017 are a continuation of British hesitancy towards Europe.
Likewise, neomercantilists view that the British public on average has become more eurosceptic
since accession. Although the media has contributed to anti-EU sentiments amongst the British
electorate, cultural differences between Europe and the UK prevent the British public from ever
fully being pro-European.
Finally, the structuralists highlight the UK’s paradoxical European policy. Historically,
the UK has been strong advocates for neoliberal economics and expansion of free trade and
markets. The UK’s anti-EU sentiments do not stem from economic policies infringing on
national sovereignty, but rather British leadership’s attempt to continue the British Empire’s
legacy. Cameron and his fellow right politicians are encouraging eurosceptic rhetoric in the
British media as a way to distract the electorate from the harsh austerity policies. Structuralists
agree with the neoliberal observation that Cameron is isolating the UK from other member
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states, and without Germany’s support, will have extreme difficulties trying to push
renegotiations.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
It is important to note that throughout this paper I have discovered that no one
perspective can fully explain the Eurozone crisis’ effects as a whole nor can explain the reaction
of one political system individually. Although certain countries may indicate an inclination to
certain policies advocated by one perspective, each perspective’s philosophies are present in
each case study. One weakness I have observed in each economic perspective is the lack of
consideration of the importance of cultural differences. I have attempted to explain these factors
in within each chapter through historical context and analysis, however, as economic
perspectives; these ideologies do not give a complete understanding. Cultural-based perspectives
such as constructivism, which studies cultural norms, values, and belief systems, can explain
these issues more fully.

SUMMARY
As neoliberals observe, Germany is still seeking cooperation with French leaders to
further economic cohesion throughout the Eurozone. This was evident through the solidification
of the SGP, the creation of the ESM, and the overall strengthening of fiscal coordination across
the Eurozone. However, as neomercantilists note, German leadership has abandoned its
historically overly cooperative approach, and has become more hesitant to concede on more
sensitive issues. This is partly due to the German public, who have become more critical – not

72

necessarily of EU institutions, but rather their fellow member states. This censure has pushed
Chancellor Merkel to pursue policies that will least impact the German economy, such as the
involvement of the IMF as a means to shift the weight of the bailout onto an international rather
than regional institution. In regards to the Eurosceptic party, AfD, it appears the political party
did experience a surge of support in 2013 during the year of the party’s creation. However, it
does not appear the party has had significant influence on German leadership’s European policy.
As each perspective has noted in varying degrees, the German public largely supports and trusts
its government’s direction through the crisis.
Arguably, French leadership has seen the most surprising changes since the outbreak of
the Eurozone crisis. As with Germany, neoliberals emphasize the continued cooperation between
France and Germany. However, the crisis has produced noticeable tensions between French and
German leadership. Though Sarkozy and Merkel were ultimately able to agree on stronger
economic cohesion for the Eurozone as a whole, Sarkozy was noticeably critical of Merkel’s
conduct towards the beginning. In the domestic setting, voters were displeased with his sudden
change of position during the 2012 presidential campaign. Most prominently, Euroscepticism has
surged amongst French citizens. Current President François Hollande was elected based on his
sharp critique of Sarkozy’s bargains with Merkel and the EU. However, as neomercantilists have
noted, even Hollande is too conciliatory towards German leadership for his French constituents.
As neomercantilists and structuralists observe, Eurosceptic sentiments producing the sudden rise
in FN coupled with public dissatisfaction with French policies are creating substantial
fragmentation within the French government. As each perspective has noted, France’s political
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pendulum was in favor of the right before the crisis, and swung to the left in 2012, and as of
2014, now seems to be swinging back in favor of the right.
Lastly, the United Kingdom has also seen a change in attitude toward leadership’s EU
policy, albeit giving the country’s historical context in European institutions, not as startling.
Scholars from all three economic perspectives have noted the prominence of the British media in
shaping public attitudes regarding EU affairs. As neoliberals identify, although Prime Minister
Cameron has not had the fondest regards towards the EU, prior to the crisis he generally did not
hold the staunch anti-EU sentiments presented by many in his own Conservative party. Due to
media sensalization of the crisis coupled with growing Euroscepticism amongst the public and
contribution to the rise in the Eurosceptic party UKIP, Cameron was forced to pursue a more
isolationist policy. Scholars have identified the 2017 referendum pledge across perspectives as a
means to appease the British electorate, even if Cameron himself appears to be half-hearted in
support for withdrawal.
The following table summarizes each perspective’s viewpoint on the crisis’ effects on
each case study. I have added an additional perspective, constructivism to highlight how a
stronger emphasis on cultural factors may have played in this thesis.
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Perspective
Neoliberalism

Neomercantilism

Structuralism

Continuity in its
legacy as a major
player in the EU

Using EU to
promote national
interests at the
regional level

Promotion of
business and
financial interests
at the EU level

France

Instrumental in
facilitating
cooperation
alongside
Germany

Strong disapproval
from society
causes government
fragmentation

French leadership
failing as potential
counterweight to
German influence
in EU

The UK

Pursuing isolating
and damaging
European policies

Natural distancing
between UK and
EU

Paradoxical
European policy;
agree with
neoliberals

Country
Germany

Alternative
Perspective:
Constructivism
German guilt
conscience and
cultural value
regarding
economy
Protective of the
preservation of
culture means
growing more
hostile towards
EU
Emphasis on
UK’s tumultuous
history with
Europe

Table 1: Comparison of Perspectives

HYPOTHESIS TESTING
To review, I hypothesized that neoliberals would view the crisis as a catalyst for closer
economic and political integration in Europe, with each member state increasing cooperation to
remedy the crisis’ effects in both their domestic economies as well as across the EU as a whole. I
also predicted that neoliberals would view Eurosceptic parties as largely in the minority, and
would not have significant effect over their respective country’s European policies. Next, I
predicted that neomercantilists would view the crisis as hindrance to integration, as an increase
in public discontentment would cause leadership to pursue their national interests. I expected that
neomercantilists would believe Eurosceptic parties would have a significant effect over their
government’s European policies, and could have the potential to create political fragmentation.
Lastly, I argued structuralists would find leadership in all three countries pursuing policies that
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would best suit business and financial interests, regardless of public opinion and any competition
from Eurosceptic parties.
In actuality, I found that each perspective viewed the situations in each case study
uniquely, rather than a broad viewpoint in every country. Both in France and the UK, neoliberals
acknowledge the prevalence of Eurosceptic parties. Neoliberals found FN prominent amongst the
French public, shaping more Eurosceptic opinions amongst voters, while in the UK, UKIP was
important in not only influencing the British public opinion, but in influencing leadership’s
European policies as well. Particularly with the UK, neoliberals noted that Cameron was
pursuing a more isolationist approach, rather than increasing cooperation with fellow member
states. However, as predicted, both France and Germany did continue both bilateral and
multilateral cooperation to further European integration. Next, as I predicted, neomercantilists
did argue that leadership in all three countries would move towards pursuing their national
interests (in varying manners). Neomercantilists found in both France and the UK Eurosceptic
parties were causing dissension in domestic politics over the crisis. However, in Germany
neomercantilists found that AfD was not as influential as FN or UKIP. Lastly, I found that only
in studying Germany did structuralists argue that leadership was pursuing policies to benefit
business and financial interests. Structuralists found that French leadership were more
considerate of the peripheral countries, while in the case of the UK, structuralists agreed with
both neoliberals and neomercantilists that the government was falling to pressure from
Eurosceptics.
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COMPARISON
Although the effect of the crisis on each country’s political system is diverse, there are a
few commonalities. I have identified three areas that have been discussed in each case study:
media, Eurosceptic parties, and the rise in Euroscepticism.
Media
Although the media is a prominent force in every political system, its effect varied from
country to country. In both France and the UK, the media espoused Eurosceptic rhetoric, often
disagreeing with their leadership’s approach. In the UK especially, media only praised
Cameron’s conduct in the EU when it was met with a hard-lined approach towards securing
national interests. In France, the media often criticized both President Sarkozy and Hollande for
being as assertive of French interests. This Euroscepticism in the media in the UK and France
has encouraged to the rise of UKIP and FN respectively.
In contrast, Germany’s media held a very different tone. Although in some newspapers to
varying degrees Chancellor Merkel was criticized for her approach to the crisis, overall, the
majority of the German press criticism was geared towards the indebted countries, not their own
leadership. Therefore, in Germany’s case, it was arguably much harder for AfD to garner support
without the media’s backing.
Role of Eurosceptics and Eurosceptic Parties
It is important to note that the parties discussed in this thesis vary in domestic ideology
and role in their respective countries’ politics. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, FN
and UKIP are categorized as hard Eurosceptic parties. Both parties advocate for their country’s
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complete withdrawal from the EU. Conversely, AfD is a soft Eurosceptic party, only supporting
Germany’s exit from the Eurozone, not the EU as a whole.
Given the observations made in UK and France, it can be assumed that from these case
studies that hard Eurosceptic parties were more effective in gaining support than soft Eurosceptic
parties. FN was (and continues to be successful) in obtaining support from the French public,
gaining seats in both the European Parliament and the French National Assembly. However, FN
was only successful in altering France’s domestic political situation, not its leadership’s
European policy. By contrast, the influence of Eurosceptics in the UK was more unique, as
external pressure from UKIP was matched with internal pressure from Eurosceptics in
Cameron’s own party. With these pressures combined, UKIP was successful in influencing
Cameron’s approach to the EU.
In Germany, AfD’s role is noticeably weaker in support and far less successful in its
attempt to influence European policy. As mentioned above, unlike FN and UKIP, AfD did not
receive as much media attention nor media support as France and UK’s Eurosceptic parties. It
also can be assumed this was due to AfD’s core message: the exit from the euro. Although
Germany’s previous national currency, the deutschmark, was strong, Germany has benefitted just
as strongly being part of the Eurozone. Consequently, only a minority of German citizens are
attracted to its message. Without media or substantial public support, AfD has not been as
successful as FN or UKIP.

78

Rise in Euroscepticism
The rise in Euroscepticism has been noted in countries across the EU, not just in
Germany, France, and the UK. However, this Euroscepticism varies in intensity across each
country. As mentioned previously, France and the UK had a noticeable increase in anti-EU
sentiments in their societies. Analyzing the data found in both case studies, this could be
attributed to both historical and economic factors. Both France and the UK have had rocky
histories with European institutions. The UK has had the most turbulence, with leadership often
creating tension with its fellow member states over its reluctance towards further integration and
supposed loss of sovereignty. In France, the historical tension is less so, but there are notable
moments when leadership was also unwilling to concede its sovereignty, particularly during the
de Gaulle years and during the debates surrounding the European Constitution. Next, the UK and
France are the second and third largest economies in the Eurozone, respectively. Although the
UK remains outside the Eurozone, both economies were affected by the crisis more than
substantially than Germany. With both these factors combined, it is therefore unsurprising that
Euroscepticism would be more prevalent in these countries.
By contrast, Germany has not been as assertive of its national interests throughout
European integration. This is largely due to the country’s need to rebuild its international
reputation during the post-WWII decades. As mentioned previously, German leadership opted to
work bilaterally with France as a means to subtly promote its national interests. Arguably the
main factor hindering Euroscepticism is the country’s economic standing. Many scholars have
identified that Germany has possibly benefitted the most from European integration. In the postwar decades the country historically held a strong currency, and currently is the strongest
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economy not only in the Eurozone, but Europe as a whole. A political factor is also at hand: the
bulk of German citizens have a positive view towards their leadership. Chancellor Merkel
appears to understand her constituency well, ensuring that her taxpayer’s dollars towards the
peripheral countries are matched with fiscal coordination and reform. Therefore, it can be
presumed that both political and economic factors have averted a strong Eurosceptic following in
the German public.

CONCLUSION
As the Eurozone crisis in an ongoing phenomenon several questions arise for further
research. As highlighted previously, the primary weakness I found in the three economic
perspectives was the lack of focus on cultural factors. Many scholars have noted the presence of
differences cultural norms and values as source of conflict in the EU. Therefore, it would be an
interesting study to research how constructivists would explain the effects of the Eurozone crisis
on the political systems of states both in the economic core and peripheries of the Eurozone.
Next, with the age of globalization and the increase in economic interdependence across
the globe, no phenomenon can remain a fully isolated event. The Eurozone crisis is no exception.
The EU remains the most powerful trading bloc in the world. The EU conducts trade with
countries spanning over each continent, with larger countries such as the United States, Russia,
and China, but smaller, rising economies as well such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Thus begs
the question, how has the Eurozone economy effected its trading partners? To provide a more
comprehensive answer to this study, both qualitative and quantitative research could be utilized
to explore this question. Quantitative research could be used to explore the figures of exports and

80

imports between these trading partners, while qualitative research could be implemented to study
socio-political effects.
To conclude, my primary inquiry for this thesis was to assess the effects of the Eurozone
crisis on the political systems of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom through the three
leading perspectives in political economy: neoliberalism, neomercantilism, and structuralism.
My main objective was to use these perspectives as a means to gain a more-depth understanding
of the crisis’s effects on each country’s domestic politics and European policies. I also attempted
to examine the role and influence of Eurosceptic parties in each case study. I attempted to fill the
literature gap in this subject area by using economic perspectives to identify socio-political
effects on each country’s political system.
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